New Cron File Created
Detects the creation of cron files in Cron directories, which could indicate potential persistence mechanisms being established by an attacker. Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system…
Description
Detects the creation of cron files in Cron directories, which could indicate potential persistence mechanisms being established by an attacker. Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system administration activities and software installations may also create cron files. This detection should be investigated in context, considering factors such as the user creating the file, the timing of creation, and the contents of the cron job. Focus investigation on unexpected cron files created by non-administrative users or during suspicious timeframes. Additionally, it is recommended to review the contents of the newly created cron files to assess their intent. Furthermore, it is suggested to baseline normal cron file creation and apply additional filters to reduce false positives based on the specific environment.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- linux
- Log source category
- file_event
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate administrative tasks, package managers, containers, configuration management tools, cloud agents, or system maintenance operations might cause false positives. Apply baselining before deployment.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/f1477c0512b0747c1455283069c21faec758e29d/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml | Only this detection cites it |
| pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/ | 5from 2 sources |
| snehbavarva.medium.com/privilege-escalation-techniques-series-linux-cron-jobs-a5b797b424b4 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms | 27from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 6c4e2f43-d94d-4ead-b64d-97e53fa2bd05
- Tagged by the source as
- attack.executionattack.persistenceattack.privilege-escalation
Licence
- Published under
- Detection Rule License 1.1Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1