PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the…
Description
Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
Known benign triggers
- False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/88d689fe8a055d8284337b9fad5d9152b42043db/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/topotam/PetitPotam | 4from 2 sources |
| isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/ | 2from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5
- Tagged by the source as
- attack.credential-access
Licence
- Published under
- Detection Rule License 1.1Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1