Unsigned .node File Loaded
Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack. .node files are native add-ons for…
Description
Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack. .node files are native add-ons for Electron-based applications, which are commonly used for desktop applications like Slack, Discord, and Visual Studio Code. This technique has been observed in the DripLoader malware, which uses unsigned .node files to load malicious native code into Electron applications.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source product
- windows
- Log source category
- image_load
Known benign triggers
- VsCode extensions or similar legitimate tools might use unsigned .node files. These should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and whitelisted if determined to be benign.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/CoreyCBurton/DripLoaderNG | Only this detection cites it |
| www.coreycburton.com/blog/driploader-case-study | Only this detection cites it |
| www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/native-code-and-electron | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e5f5c693-52d7-4de5-88ae-afbfbce85595
- Tagged by the source as
- attack.executionattack.persistenceattack.privilege-escalationattack.stealth
Licence
- Published under
- Detection Rule License 1.1Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 4, 2026
- Version
- 2