WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be an indicator of…
Description
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- windows
- Log source category
- image_load
Known benign triggers
- Since the ImageLoad event doesn't have enough information in this case. It's better to look at the recent process creation events that spawned the WMIC process and investigate the command line and parent/child processes to get more insights
- The command `wmic ntevent` loads vbscript.dll
- The command wmic os get lastbootuptime loads vbscript.dll
- The command wmic os get locale loads vbscript.dll
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ | 2 |
| securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html | 2from 2 sources |
| twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
- Tagged by the source as
- attack.stealth
Licence
- Published under
- Detection Rule License 1.1Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1