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MediumSigmaHQ Matthew Green @mgreen27 +4

Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename

Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Platform: Linux macOS Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Log source product: windows
Log source category: process_creation

Known benign triggers

Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist

References

Links the source published beside this detection. Reference is the link the source wrote, unmodified. Class is decided by this catalogue from the host and path, not stated by the source. Cited by counts published detections citing the same resource, including this one, and the sources beneath it count the repositories this catalogue ingests, which is not the same as independent research.
Reference	Class	Cited by
github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process	Detection test	Only this detection cites it
mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html	Unclassified	2
mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html	Unclassified	2
www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html	Security research	2

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