Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific…
Description
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source product
- windows
- Log source category
- registry_set
Known benign triggers
- Administrative activity, still unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language | Only this detection cites it |
| www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell | Only this detection cites it |
| www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
- Tagged by the source as
- attack.defense-impairmentattack.persistenceattack.privilege-escalation
Licence
- Published under
- Detection Rule License 1.1Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 4, 2026
- Version
- 2