GKE Service Account Token Created via TokenRequest API
Detects creation of a GKE service account token through the TokenRequest API by a non-system identity. TokenRequest allows programmatic minting of short-lived tokens for any service account the caller can create…
Description
Detects creation of a GKE service account token through the TokenRequest API by a non-system identity. TokenRequest allows programmatic minting of short-lived tokens for any service account the caller can create tokens for, without reading a mounted projected token from disk. Attackers with initial cluster access can abuse this API to obtain tokens for more privileged service accounts, pivot via Workload Identity to GCP APIs, or retain access after pod termination. Unlike filesystem token theft, TokenRequest activity is visible only in Kubernetes audit logs as create against the serviceaccounts/token subresource.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Platform agents, admission webhooks, and CI jobs may legitimately call TokenRequest under non-standard identities. Baseline approved automation by client.user.email after validation. Expected GKE and kube-system controllers are excluded; expand exclusions if additional managed components appear in telemetry.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authentication-resources/token-v1/ | Only this detection cites it |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.persistence.create-token/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 5d505bed-6d0e-4afa-b445-64841d4b8c58
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: GCPData Source: Google Cloud PlatformDomain: CloudDomain: KubernetesResources: Investigation GuideTactic: Credential AccessUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 27, 2026
- Version
- 1