Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP
Identifies a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate…
Description
Identifies a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp | 9from 3 sources |
| github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay | 3from 2 sources |
| googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html | 9from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3605a013-6f0c-4f7d-88a5-326f5be262ec
- Tagged by the source as
- Credential AccessElasticHostPrivilege EscalationThreat DetectionWindows
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 27, 2026
- Version
- 1