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Potential Impersonation Attempt via Kubectl

This rule detects potential impersonation attempts via the "kubectl" command in Linux and macOS environments. It identifies process events where "kubectl" is executed with arguments that suggest an attempt to…

Description

This rule detects potential impersonation attempts via the "kubectl" command in Linux and macOS environments. It identifies process events where "kubectl" is executed with arguments that suggest an attempt to impersonate another user or group, such as using "--kubeconfig", "--token", "--as", or "--as-group". This could indicate an adversary trying to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges within a Kubernetes cluster. If this rule is triggered, in conjunction with rules related to secret access or kubeconfig file discovery, it may indicate a potential impersonation attempt.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

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