AWS SSM Session Manager Child Process Execution
Identifies process start events where the parent process is the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Session Manager worker. Session Manager provides interactive shell access to EC2 instances and hybrid nodes without bastion…
Description
Identifies process start events where the parent process is the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Session Manager worker. Session Manager provides interactive shell access to EC2 instances and hybrid nodes without bastion hosts or open inbound ports. Adversaries abuse it for remote execution and lateral movement using legitimate AWS credentials and IAM permissions. This rule surfaces endpoint execution occurring under that worker for visibility and hunting. Expect noise from authorized administrative sessions.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate operators using AWS Systems Manager Session Manager to administer instances will spawn child processes under the session worker. Tune with host, user, or command-line exclusions for known automation and break-glass workflows.
- The SSM agent may invoke short-lived utilities (for example identity or environment probes) during session setup. Additional exclusions may be required in your environment.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/session-manager.html | Only this detection cites it |
| hackingthe.cloud/aws/post_exploitation/run_shell_commands_on_ec2/ | 2 |
| www.mitiga.io/blog/abusing-the-amazon-web-services-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- cf2b8cf5-3364-4396-b551-42aae9b6d37e
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: SentinelOneDomain: CloudDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: LinuxOS: macOSOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxPlatform: macOSPlatform: WindowsProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3