Execution via GitHub Actions Runner
This rule detects potentially dangerous commands spawned by the GitHub Actions Runner.Worker process or by shell interpreters launched via a runner entrypoint script on self-hosted runner machines. Adversaries who…
Description
This rule detects potentially dangerous commands spawned by the GitHub Actions Runner.Worker process or by shell interpreters launched via a runner entrypoint script on self-hosted runner machines. Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host. This behavior may indicate malicious or unexpected workflow activity, including code execution, reconnaissance, credential harvesting, or network exfiltration initiated through a compromised repository or unauthorized workflow.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Authorized GitHub actions runner with no malicious workflow actions.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter598 detections cover this technique
- T1059.001PowerShell377 detections cover this technique
- T1059.002AppleScript31 detections cover this technique
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell95 detections cover this technique
- T1059.004Unix Shell197 detections cover this technique
- T1059.006Python55 detections cover this technique
- T1059.007JavaScript68 detections cover this technique
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-v2 | 7 |
| www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise | 12 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a640ef5b-e1da-4b17-8391-468fdbd1b517
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: Microsoft Defender XDRData Source: SentinelOneData Source: SysmonData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: LinuxOS: macOSOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxPlatform: macOSPlatform: WindowsProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: ExecutionTactic: Initial AccessThreat: Living off the LandThreat: Supply ChainUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3