AWS Cognito Unauthenticated Identity Pool Credentials Issued
Identifies AWS CloudTrail data events where an unauthenticated identity successfully retrieves temporary AWS credentials from a Cognito Identity Pool via GetCredentialsForIdentity. Cognito Identity Pools can be…
Description
Identifies AWS CloudTrail data events where an unauthenticated identity successfully retrieves temporary AWS credentials from a Cognito Identity Pool via GetCredentialsForIdentity. Cognito Identity Pools can be configured to allow unauthenticated (guest) access, intended for scenarios like anonymous app analytics, but a pool that grants those anonymous identities meaningful IAM permissions becomes a public, unauthenticated path to real AWS credentials. Adversaries who discover an identity pool ID (often embedded in mobile app binaries, web app JavaScript, or public source repositories) can call GetId followed by GetCredentialsForIdentity with no login token at all to obtain temporary credentials, then use them to access whatever the pool's unauthenticated role permits. This is a New Terms rule that limits alerting to identity pools that have not been observed issuing credentials to an unauthenticated caller before, since some applications intentionally and continuously use guest access as part of normal operation.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Applications that intentionally allow unauthenticated Identity Pool access for legitimate purposes (for example, anonymous usage analytics or unauthenticated content delivery) will trigger this rule the first time that pattern is observed for a given identity pool. Confirm whether the pool's unauthenticated role grants only the minimal permissions the application actually needs, and treat repeated alerts for the same pool as expected once validated.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/identity-pool-roles.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/tree/master/pacu/modules/cognito__attack | Only this detection cites it |
| hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/cognito_identity_pool_excessive_privileges/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- c61fee20-4d00-4b39-a6e6-acddcc4433e2
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS CognitoDomain: CloudNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Asset Visibility
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3