AWS VPC Flow Logs Deletion
Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Flow log deletions by unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/delete-flow-logs.html | 2from 2 sources |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html | 2from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 9395fd2c-9947-4472-86ef-4aceb2f7e872
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS EC2Tactic: Defense Evasion
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3