AWS GuardDuty Member Account Manipulation
Detects attempts to disassociate or manipulate Amazon GuardDuty member accounts within an AWS organization. In multi-account GuardDuty deployments, a delegated administrator account aggregates findings from member…
Description
Detects attempts to disassociate or manipulate Amazon GuardDuty member accounts within an AWS organization. In multi-account GuardDuty deployments, a delegated administrator account aggregates findings from member accounts. Adversaries may attempt to disassociate member accounts, delete member relationships, stop monitoring members, or delete pending invitations to break this centralized visibility. These actions can be precursors to or alternatives for deleting GuardDuty detectors entirely, allowing attackers to operate undetected in member accounts while the administrator account loses visibility. This rule identifies successful API calls that manipulate GuardDuty member relationships, which are rare in normal operations and warrant immediate investigation.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- GuardDuty member relationships may be modified during legitimate organizational changes such as account migrations, security architecture restructuring, or delegated administrator transitions. Verify whether the user identity and timing align with approved change management processes. If this is expected administrative activity, it can be exempted from the rule.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteMembers.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_StopMonitoringMembers.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_accounts.html | Only this detection cites it |
| permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3c59d2e1-8ca1-4f13-b2ac-f4bb99ff69d7
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS GuardDutyDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS GuardDutyTactic: Defense Evasion
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3