AWS Attempt to Leave Organization
Detects any attempt, successful or denied, for a member account to leave an AWS Organization via the LeaveOrganization API. Leaving an organization immediately strips the account of every Service Control Policy (SCP)…
Description
Detects any attempt, successful or denied, for a member account to leave an AWS Organization via the LeaveOrganization API. Leaving an organization immediately strips the account of every Service Control Policy (SCP) guardrail the organization enforces, removes it from centralized CloudTrail aggregation, and eliminates the management account's ability to audit or control it going forward. An adversary who has gained root or organization-management-capable access in a member account may use this technique to escape organizational security controls and operate unmonitored. Denied attempts are included because a blocked call is just as strong a signal of intent as a successful one, and is often the only trace left when the account's default permissions correctly prevent the action.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Accounts may legitimately leave an organization during company splits, divestitures, or other structural changes. This action requires the account's root credentials or an explicit policy granting `organizations:LeaveOrganization`. Any unexpected event, successful or denied, should be treated as a critical incident requiring immediate investigation and confirmation with account/organization owners.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_LeaveOrganization.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_accounts_remove.html | Only this detection cites it |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.organizations-leave/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4236393d-090e-4dfa-9e32-c9a7ec6189ee
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS OrganizationsDomain: CloudNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS OrganizationsTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: ImpactUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3