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AWS RDS DB Instance Restored

Identifies the restoration of an AWS RDS database instance from a snapshot or S3 backup. Adversaries with access to valid credentials may restore copies of existing databases to bypass logging and monitoring controls…

Description

Identifies the restoration of an AWS RDS database instance from a snapshot or S3 backup. Adversaries with access to valid credentials may restore copies of existing databases to bypass logging and monitoring controls or to exfiltrate sensitive data from a duplicated environment. This rule detects successful restoration operations using "RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot" or "RestoreDBInstanceFromS3", which may indicate unauthorized data access or post-compromise defense evasion.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Restoring an RDS DB instance may be performed legitimately during troubleshooting, development refresh processes, migrations, or disaster-recovery drills. Validate the user identity, source IP, automation context, and whether the restoration aligns with a known maintenance or testing workflow before treating the event as suspicious. Expected behavior can be exempted through rule exceptions.

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