AWS Discovery API Calls from VPN ASN for the First Time by Identity
Flags the first time a given IAM principal invokes a narrow set of high-signal discovery APIs (credential check, account and IAM enumeration, bucket and compute inventory, logging introspection) from a source IP…
Description
Flags the first time a given IAM principal invokes a narrow set of high-signal discovery APIs (credential check, account and IAM enumeration, bucket and compute inventory, logging introspection) from a source IP whose autonomous system number (ASN) matches a curated set commonly associated with consumer VPN brands, VPN-heavy hosting, and provider networks referenced in public reporting on TeamPCP activity (for example 31173 Services AB AS39351 and Oy Crea Nova Hosting Solution Ltd). Broad `List*`/`Describe*` patterns are intentionally omitted to reduce noise. Hosting ASNs are heavily dual-use; validate `source.as.number` in your data and extend `event.action` only when your baseline allows it.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Administrators, developers, CI runners, and SaaS egress often exit through Datacamp, M247, Vultr, Linode, or brand-name VPN ASNs. Expect more noise on hosting ASNs than on VPN-only registrations. Exclude approved principals, accounts, CIDRs, or ASNs after review. GeoIP and ASN enrichment gaps (`source.as.number` unset) will skip events entirely. Maintain the ASN list with local intelligence (for example RIPE, BGPView, or peeringdb).
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/ | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference.html | 2 |
| github.com/bountyyfi/bad-asn-list/blob/main/all.txt | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e3c7a891-4b2d-4e8c-a1f0-9d8e7c6b5a4d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: DiscoveryUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3