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AWS Account Discovery By Rare User

Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, an identity performs AWS Organizations or IAM account enumeration APIs. Attackers with compromised credentials often map the organization (accounts, OUs, roots,…

Description

Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, an identity performs AWS Organizations or IAM account enumeration APIs. Attackers with compromised credentials often map the organization (accounts, OUs, roots, delegated admins) and account-level metadata (aliases, summary) using the AWS CLI or SDKs. This is a New Terms rule detecting a rare occurrence of the `cloud.account.id` and `user.name` pair for these actions.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Organization and security administrators, billing tooling, landing-zone automation, and delegated administrator workflows may call these APIs legitimately. Interactive or one-off use from unusual principals warrants review.

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