AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput Tampering
Detects creation, modification, or deletion of AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput via the CreateProvisionedModelThroughput, UpdateProvisionedModelThroughput, and DeleteProvisionedModelThroughput APIs.…
Description
Detects creation, modification, or deletion of AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput via the CreateProvisionedModelThroughput, UpdateProvisionedModelThroughput, and DeleteProvisionedModelThroughput APIs. Provisioned Throughput reserves dedicated, billed model capacity for Amazon Bedrock. An adversary who scales this capacity up can drive large, unauthorized cost (cloud resource/bill hijacking), while deleting reserved throughput can cause denial of service to production workloads that depend on that committed capacity. These control-plane changes should be validated against approved capacity-planning and change-management processes.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSLinuxmacOSSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Provisioned Throughput changes may be performed by platform, ML, or FinOps teams as part of capacity planning, scaling for production demand, or cost optimization. Infrastructure-as-code pipelines and automation roles may also create, update, or delete provisioned throughput during deployments. Verify that the user identity, user agent, and source IP correspond to known administrators or automation and that a corresponding change request exists. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_CreateProvisionedModelThroughput.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteProvisionedModelThroughput.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateProvisionedModelThroughput.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/prov-throughput.html | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 42b5e06d-b297-4286-a004-ae0da92c5b81
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0029Mitre Atlas: AML.T0034Data Source: Amazon BedrockData Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS BedrockData Source: AWS CloudTrailDomain: CloudDomain: GenAINoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS BedrockTactic: ImpactThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 2, 2026
- Version
- 4