AWS Access Token Used from Multiple Addresses
This rule identifies potentially suspicious activity by detecting instances where a single IAM user's temporary session token is accessed from multiple IP addresses within a short time frame. Such behavior may…
Description
This rule identifies potentially suspicious activity by detecting instances where a single IAM user's temporary session token is accessed from multiple IP addresses within a short time frame. Such behavior may suggest that an adversary has compromised temporary credentials and is utilizing them from various locations. To enhance detection accuracy and minimize false positives, the rule incorporates criteria that evaluate unique IP addresses, user agents, cities, and networks. These additional checks help distinguish between legitimate distributed access patterns and potential credential misuse. Detected activities are classified into different types based on the combination of unique indicators, with each classification assigned a fidelity score reflecting the likelihood of malicious behavior. High fidelity scores are given to patterns most indicative of threats, such as multiple unique IPs, networks, cities, and user agents. Medium and low fidelity scores correspond to less severe patterns, enabling security teams to effectively prioritize alerts.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- Highly distributed environments (e.g., globally deployed automation or edge nodes) may cause a single IAM user to appear from multiple IPs. Review the geolocation, network context, and user agent patterns to rule out benign use. This rule automatically excludes console login sessions, reducing false positives from legitimate console-based access across VPN or network changes.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/ | 5 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 0d92d30a-5f3e-4b71-bc3d-4a0c4914b7e0
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudNoise: HighPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLService: AWS IAMTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3