AWS EC2 Instance Console Login via Assumed Role
Detects successful AWS Management Console or federation login activity performed using an EC2 instance’s assumed role credentials. EC2 instances typically use temporary credentials to make API calls, not to…
Description
Detects successful AWS Management Console or federation login activity performed using an EC2 instance’s assumed role credentials. EC2 instances typically use temporary credentials to make API calls, not to authenticate interactively via the console. A successful "ConsoleLogin" or "GetSigninToken" event using a session pattern that includes "i-" (the EC2 instance ID) is highly anomalous and may indicate that an adversary obtained the instance’s temporary credentials from the instance metadata service (IMDS) and used them to access the console. Such activity can enable lateral movement, privilege escalation, or persistence within the AWS account.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- This is very uncommon behavior and should result in minimal false positives, ensure validity of the triggered event and include exceptions where necessary.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_enable-console-custom-url.html | Only this detection cites it |
| redcanary.com/blog/aws-sts/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d1e5e410-3e34-412e-9b1f-dd500b3b55cd
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS EC2Data Source: AWS Sign-InData Source: AWS STSDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Service: AWS EC2Service: AWS STSTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Lateral MovementTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 8, 2026
- Version
- 4