AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token
Detects attempts to create or enable a Virtual MFA device (CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice) using temporary AWS credentials (access keys beginning with ASIA). Session credentials are short-lived and tied to…
Description
Detects attempts to create or enable a Virtual MFA device (CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice) using temporary AWS credentials (access keys beginning with ASIA). Session credentials are short-lived and tied to existing authenticated sessions, so using them to register or enable MFA devices is unusual. Adversaries who compromise temporary credentials may abuse this behavior to establish persistence by attaching new MFA devices to maintain access to high-privilege accounts despite key rotation or password resets.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Some legitimate administrative workflows or CI/CD automation pipelines may temporarily configure or re-enable MFA devices using session-based credentials. Validate the calling identity’s purpose, source IP, and user agent to confirm whether this activity was authorized. This rule automatically excludes console login sessions, which filters out expected MFA operations performed via the AWS Management Console.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/ | 5 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e4feea34-3b62-4c83-b77f-018fbef48c00
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Service: AWS IAMTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3