AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Foundation Model Access Attempt
Identifies failed, access-denied attempts to enable account-level access to an Amazon Bedrock foundation model, either by granting a foundation-model entitlement, submitting a use case for model access, or creating a…
Description
Identifies failed, access-denied attempts to enable account-level access to an Amazon Bedrock foundation model, either by granting a foundation-model entitlement, submitting a use case for model access, or creating a foundation-model agreement (accepting the EULA). These account-level "model access" actions unlock a foundation model so that it can subsequently be invoked. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting these actions may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing for the ability to unlock expensive models (LLMjacking) or to establish a durable ability to invoke models. Unlike the companion rule that detects successful model-access grants, this rule surfaces the attempt itself, which is a high-signal indicator of credential boundary-testing even though access was not granted.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Access-denied errors can result from benign permission gaps: a newly created role or user whose IAM policy has not yet been provisioned, automation pipelines running ahead of permission grants, or ML teams experimenting in non-production accounts during onboarding. Verify that the principal, source IP, and user agent are expected before escalating. Recurring denials from known onboarding or provisioning workflows can be exempted for specific users or roles.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_CreateFoundationModelAgreement.html | 2 |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_PutUseCaseForModelAccess.html | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3d2e8c90-5be7-4a57-9de4-58be75af933f
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0012Mitre Atlas: AML.T0040Data Source: Amazon BedrockData Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS BedrockData Source: AWS CloudTrailDomain: CloudDomain: GenAINoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS BedrockTactic: PersistenceThreat: LLMjackingThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 8, 2026
- Version
- 5