AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Resource-Based Policy Modification Attempt
Detects failed, access-denied attempts to modify or delete resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which…
Description
Detects failed, access-denied attempts to modify or delete resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which principals (including external accounts) may access Bedrock resources such as agents, knowledge bases, and custom models. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting to attach or remove these policies may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing for the ability to grant external or cross-account access, or to weaken existing access controls. Unlike the companion rule that detects successful changes, this rule surfaces the attempt itself, which is a high-signal indicator of credential boundary-testing even though no change occurred.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Access-denied errors can result from benign permission gaps: a newly created role or user whose IAM policy has not yet been provisioned, infrastructure-as-code pipelines running ahead of permission grants, or developers experimenting in non-production accounts. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and source IP are expected to manage Bedrock resource policies in your environment. Recurring denials from known automation or onboarding workflows can be exempted from the rule.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteResourcePolicy.html | 2 |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_PutResourcePolicy.html | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 2e99477f-6099-48a9-ae0e-68801d97079c
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0012Data Source: Amazon BedrockData Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS BedrockData Source: AWS CloudTrailDomain: CloudDomain: GenAINoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS BedrockTactic: PersistenceThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 2, 2026
- Version
- 4