AWS IAM Create User via Assumed Role on EC2 Instance
Detects the creation of an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user initiated by an assumed role on an EC2 instance. Assumed roles allow users or services to temporarily adopt different AWS permissions, but the…
Description
Detects the creation of an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user initiated by an assumed role on an EC2 instance. Assumed roles allow users or services to temporarily adopt different AWS permissions, but the creation of IAM users through these roles, particularly from within EC2 instances, may indicate a compromised instance. Adversaries might exploit such permissions to establish persistence by creating new IAM users under unauthorized conditions.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Assumed roles may be used by legitimate automated systems to create IAM users for specific workflows. Verify if this event aligns with known automation activities. If the action is routine for specific roles or user agents (e.g., `aws-cli`, `boto3`), consider adding those roles or user agents to a monitored exception list for streamlined review.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateUser.html | 2 |
| www.dionach.com/en-us/breaking-into-the-cloud-red-team-tactics-for-aws-compromise/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f7a1c536-9ac0-11ef-9911-f661ea17fbcd
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsService: AWS EC2Service: AWS IAMTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3