AWS IAM Login Profile Created or Modified for an IAM User
Identifies creation or modification of a console login profile for an AWS IAM user via CreateLoginProfile or UpdateLoginProfile. A login profile enables password-based console sign-in for an IAM user. Adversaries who…
Description
Identifies creation or modification of a console login profile for an AWS IAM user via CreateLoginProfile or UpdateLoginProfile. A login profile enables password-based console sign-in for an IAM user. Adversaries who obtain programmatic credentials may create a login profile to add persistent interactive console access, or update an existing profile to reset another user's password and take over the account, even after the original access keys are rotated. Because console access for IAM users is increasingly provisioned through federation or IAM Identity Center, direct use of these APIs by an unexpected principal warrants review. This rule targets IAM users (the userName parameter is present); creation of a login profile for the account root user is covered by a separate rule.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Administrators and identity teams may legitimately create or reset console login profiles during user onboarding, password resets, or break-glass procedures. Verify the principal in "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn", the target user in "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters", and whether the change aligns with an approved request. Known administration roles and provisioning automation can be excluded after validation.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateLoginProfile.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateLoginProfile.html | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f4dc90eb-e77e-4f0e-b18b-eb50da9e827e
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS IAMTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3