AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Cross-Account Invocation
Identifies a change to an AWS Lambda function resource policy that grants invoke permissions to an AWS account principal. Using AddPermission, an adversary can authorize a principal in another account to call a…
Description
Identifies a change to an AWS Lambda function resource policy that grants invoke permissions to an AWS account principal. Using AddPermission, an adversary can authorize a principal in another account to call a function, creating a cross-account backdoor for execution or for relaying data to attacker-controlled infrastructure without modifying the function's code. This rule excludes public grants (principal set to "*"), which are covered by a separate rule, and grants to AWS service principals, which are common for legitimate event triggers.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Cross-account invoke permissions are used for legitimate multi-account architectures and partner integrations. Verify the granted account in `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters`, the function, and the `principal` value in `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` against approved cross-account access. Known partner or internal account ids can be excluded after validation. This rule cannot distinguish a grant to the function's own account from an external account, so same-account resource-policy grants (uncommon, since same-account invocation normally uses IAM identity-based policies) will also alert.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_AddPermission.html | 2 |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/access-control-resource-based.html | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 8f985da6-66e8-4838-a63e-21636eb9adc5
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS LambdaDomain: CloudNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Service: AWS LambdaTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3