AWS Sensitive IAM Operations Performed via CloudShell
Identifies sensitive AWS IAM operations performed via AWS CloudShell based on the user agent string. CloudShell is a browser-based shell that provides command-line access to AWS resources directly from the AWS…
Description
Identifies sensitive AWS IAM operations performed via AWS CloudShell based on the user agent string. CloudShell is a browser-based shell that provides command-line access to AWS resources directly from the AWS Management Console. While convenient for administrators, CloudShell access from compromised console sessions can enable attackers to perform privileged operations without installing tools or using programmatic credentials. This rule detects high-risk actions such as creating IAM users, access keys, roles, or attaching policies when initiated from CloudShell, which may indicate post-compromise credential harvesting or privilege escalation activity.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Administrators may legitimately use CloudShell for IAM management tasks during routine operations or troubleshooting. Verify whether the user, source IP, and specific actions align with expected administrative workflows. Establish a baseline of normal CloudShell usage patterns to reduce false positives.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/cloudshell/latest/userguide/welcome.html | Only this detection cites it |
| permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud | 7 |
| www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a | 9from 3 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 41554afd-d839-4cc2-b185-170ac01cbefc
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudNoise: MediumPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS IAMTactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3