AWS Bedrock API Key Phantom User Activity Outside Bedrock
Identifies an Amazon Bedrock API key phantom user (an IAM user whose name starts with "BedrockAPIKey-") acting as the caller of a non-Bedrock API request, such as IAM, STS, EC2, VPC, or KMS calls. These users are…
Description
Identifies an Amazon Bedrock API key phantom user (an IAM user whose name starts with "BedrockAPIKey-") acting as the caller of a non-Bedrock API request, such as IAM, STS, EC2, VPC, or KMS calls. These users are provisioned by AWS to back a Bedrock bearer token and carry the AmazonBedrockLimitedAccess managed policy, which also grants IAM, VPC, and KMS reconnaissance. A phantom user performing activity outside of Bedrock indicates its credentials are being used beyond their intended scope, which is the privilege-escalation path realized: an attacker who created standard IAM access keys for the phantom user is now using them for reconnaissance or lateral movement outside the Bedrock authentication boundary.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Automation or SDK tooling configured with a Bedrock API key may call non-Bedrock APIs for benign credential validation. Ubiquitous no-op STS identity calls (GetCallerIdentity, GetSessionToken, GetAccessKeyInfo) are excluded; other non-Bedrock activity by a BedrockAPIKey-* principal — recon, privilege escalation, lateral movement, or exfiltration — is unexpected for an inference-only key. Confirm the key and source in "source.ip"/"user_agent.original" are sanctioned.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/api-keys.html | 3 |
| www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/aws-bedrock-security-api-keys | 3 |
| www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/aws-bedrock-security-guide-api-keys-detection-response | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 56788ae8-794b-4ade-affd-534aa5c9e28d
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0012Mitre Atlas: AML.T0055Data Source: Amazon BedrockData Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS BedrockData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudDomain: GenAINoise: MediumPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS BedrockService: AWS IAMTactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 2, 2026
- Version
- 4