AWS IAM Permissions Boundary Modified or Removed
Identifies the modification or removal of an IAM permissions boundary on an IAM user or role. A permissions boundary caps the maximum permissions an identity can have, regardless of its attached identity policies. An…
Description
Identifies the modification or removal of an IAM permissions boundary on an IAM user or role. A permissions boundary caps the maximum permissions an identity can have, regardless of its attached identity policies. An adversary who can delete a boundary ("DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary", "DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary") or replace it with a more permissive one ("PutUserPermissionsBoundary", "PutRolePermissionsBoundary") can lift that cap and unlock permissions the identity's policies already grant, enabling privilege escalation. Boundary changes are infrequent and usually performed by a small set of administrators or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, so changes by unexpected principals warrant review.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Permissions boundaries are managed by identity/platform teams and infrastructure-as-code pipelines as part of normal governance. Verify the principal in `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, the targeted user or role, and the boundary policy against approved change records. Known administration roles and deployment automation can be excluded after validation.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html | Only this detection cites it |
| hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/iam_privilege_escalation/ | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 0f5d410c-a594-4cdb-8b48-f36a61838d67
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS IAMDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Service: AWS IAMTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3