AWS STS Role Assumption by Service
Identifies when a service has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Services can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential…
Description
Identifies when a service has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Services can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential access and privilege escalation. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when a service assumes a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS) to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. While often legitimate, adversaries may use this technique for unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within an AWS environment.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- AWS administrators or automated processes might regularly assume roles for legitimate administrative purposes. AWS services might assume roles to access AWS resources as part of their standard operations. Automated workflows might assume roles to perform periodic tasks such as data backups, updates, or deployments.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html | 4from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 93075852-b0f5-4b8b-89c3-a226efae5726
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS CloudTrailData Source: AWS STSDomain: CloudNoise: HighPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsService: AWS STSTactic: Lateral MovementTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3