AWS SageMaker Execution Role Passed by Unusual Principal
Identifies the first time an IAM principal passes a given execution role (`roleArn`) to an Amazon SageMaker resource, via `CreateNotebookInstance`, `CreateTrainingJob`, `CreateProcessingJob`, `CreateAutoMLJob`, or…
Description
Identifies the first time an IAM principal passes a given execution role (`roleArn`) to an Amazon SageMaker resource, via `CreateNotebookInstance`, `CreateTrainingJob`, `CreateProcessingJob`, `CreateAutoMLJob`, or `CreatePipeline`. These actions require `iam:PassRole` and attach an IAM role that the created resource then runs as. An adversary holding both SageMaker create permissions and a broad `iam:PassRole` grant can pass a more privileged role to a resource they control and execute code as that role, escalating privileges. The rule keys on the combination of the calling principal and the passed `roleArn`, so it surfaces a principal using an execution role it has not used before in the last 7 days; a role whose account differs from the caller's, or that is more privileged than the caller, is especially suspicious.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- MLOps pipelines and data science teams routinely create SageMaker resources with execution roles, and new pipelines or team members appear as new principals on first use. Verify the principal in `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, the passed roleArn in `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters`, and whether the role's privileges and the activity are approved. Known automation roles can be excluded after validation.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/sagemaker/latest/APIReference/API_CreateNotebookInstance.html | Only this detection cites it |
| docs.aws.amazon.com/sagemaker/latest/dg/sagemaker-roles.html | Only this detection cites it |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.execution.sagemaker-update-lifecycle-config/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- ca8c2751-5507-44f2-b58d-08958200cde9
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS SageMakerDomain: CloudNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AWSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3