AWS Bedrock AgentCore Runtime Prompt Targeting Credentials or Instance Metadata
Identifies prompts sent to an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime that attempt to harvest credentials or coerce the agent into exfiltrating data. The runtime application logs capture the caller-supplied prompt; this…
Description
Identifies prompts sent to an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime that attempt to harvest credentials or coerce the agent into exfiltrating data. The runtime application logs capture the caller-supplied prompt; this rule flags prompts that reference the cloud instance metadata service (169.254.169.254, the ECS task metadata address, or the "latest/meta-data" / "security-credentials" paths), prompts that name AWS access or secret keys directly, and prompt-injection or jailbreak language ("ignore previous instructions", "developer mode", "do anything now") combined with intent to reveal secrets, system prompts, or send data to an external endpoint. Asking an agent to read instance metadata credentials or to exfiltrate secrets is rarely legitimate and indicates an attempt to weaponize the agent for credential theft, even when the model refuses the request.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- Developer or documentation content that legitimately discusses the instance metadata service or AWS key formats could match. Review the prompt in "aws.bedrock_agentcore.request_payload.prompt" to confirm intent.
- Security testing, red-team exercises, or guardrail validation may intentionally send prompt-injection or credential-harvesting payloads to an agent. Confirm the source session and caller, and exclude approved testing identities after validation.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/observability.html | 2 |
| unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bypass-of-aws-sandbox-network-isolation-mode/ | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 9c2f1d6a-4e8b-4c7a-9f3d-2b6e1a0c5d44
- Tagged by the source as
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0054Mitre Atlas: AML.T0098Data Source: Amazon BedrockData Source: Amazon Web ServicesData Source: AWSData Source: AWS BedrockDomain: CloudDomain: GenAINoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: AWSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLService: AWS BedrockTactic: Credential AccessThreat: IMDS Credential TheftThreat: LLMjackingThreat: Unauthorized AI UsageUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 2, 2026
- Version
- 4