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Azure AKS Service Account Token Created via TokenRequest API

Detects an identity minting a service account token via the AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) TokenRequest API (serviceaccounts/token), excluding known AKS control-plane and platform identities. Adversaries request…

Description

Detects an identity minting a service account token via the AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) TokenRequest API (serviceaccounts/token), excluding known AKS control-plane and platform identities. Adversaries request service account tokens from a compromised identity to impersonate a workload, move laterally, or escalate privileges within the cluster. Coverage includes workload service accounts (system:serviceaccount:*), so a compromised in-cluster token minting a token for another service account is not excluded.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

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Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Controllers, CI/CD systems, and platform components legitimately request service account tokens. Baseline the requesting identities and exclude verified automation after review.

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