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Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow with Concurrent Sign-ins

Identifies Entra ID device code authentication flows where multiple user agents are observed within the same session. This pattern is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker's polling client (e.g.,…

Description

Identifies Entra ID device code authentication flows where multiple user agents are observed within the same session. This pattern is indicative of device code phishing, where an attacker's polling client (e.g., Python script) and the victim's browser both appear in the same authentication session. In legitimate device code flows, the user authenticates via browser while the requesting application polls for tokens - when these have distinctly different user agents (e.g., Python Requests vs Chrome), it may indicate the code was phished and redeemed by an attacker.

Detection logic

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Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

  • Legitimate use of device code flow where a user authenticates via browser for a CLI tool or headless application. Common legitimate scenarios include Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, or VS Code remote development. Review the user agent combinations - browser + known CLI tool from the same user may be expected behavior.

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