Azure Service Principal Sign-In Followed by Arc Cluster Credential Access
Detects when a service principal authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID and then lists credentials for an Azure Arc-connected Kubernetes cluster within a short time window. The `listClusterUserCredential` action…
Description
Detects when a service principal authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID and then lists credentials for an Azure Arc-connected Kubernetes cluster within a short time window. The `listClusterUserCredential` action retrieves tokens that enable kubectl access through the Arc Cluster Connect proxy. This sequence (service principal sign-in followed by Arc credential retrieval), represents the exact attack chain used by adversaries with stolen service principal secrets to establish a proxy tunnel into Kubernetes clusters. Service principals that authenticate externally (as opposed to managed identities) and immediately access Arc cluster credentials warrant investigation, particularly when the sign-in originates from an unexpected location or ASN.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Administrators using service principal credentials to manage Arc-connected clusters during maintenance windows may trigger this rule. Correlate with change management records.
- CI/CD pipelines that authenticate as a service principal and then access Arc clusters as part of deployment workflows will trigger this rule. Identify and exclude known automation service principal app IDs.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-arc/kubernetes/cluster-connect | 3 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/connectedk8s#az-connectedk8s-proxy | 2 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins | 6from 2 sources |
| www.ibm.com/think/x-force/identifying-abusing-azure-arc-for-hybrid-escalation-persistence | 3 |
| www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/08/27/storm-0501s-evolving-techniques-lead-to-cloud-based-ransomware/ | 13 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- dacfbecd-7927-46a7-a8ba-feb65a2e990d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Activity LogsData Source: Azure ArcData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AzurePlatform: Entra IDResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3