Azure AKS Kubelet Proxy to Command Execution Endpoint
Detects use of the AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) API server nodes/proxy subresource to reach a node's Kubelet command-execution endpoints (run, exec, attach, portforward, cri). Unlike benign monitoring that scrapes…
Description
Detects use of the AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) API server nodes/proxy subresource to reach a node's Kubelet command-execution endpoints (run, exec, attach, portforward, cri). Unlike benign monitoring that scrapes /metrics and /stats, a request to these endpoints executes commands inside a pod on the node, the core of the kubeletctl and Peirates lateral-movement technique. Even a GET to /exec is command execution because the Kubelet maps the WebSocket upgrade handshake to the RBAC get verb, so nodes/proxy GET is sufficient for remote code execution.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate use of the Kubelet run/exec/attach/portforward endpoints via nodes/proxy is rare. Administrative debugging tools that proxy exec through the API server may match; baseline and exclude verified operators.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/inguardians/peirates | 6 |
| grahamhelton.com/blog/nodes-proxy-rce | Only this detection cites it |
| horizon3.ai/attack-research/when-read-only-isnt-k8s-nodes-proxy-get-to-rce/ | 2 |
| microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/ | 15 |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.privilege-escalation.nodes-proxy/ | 3 |
| www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/using-kubelet-client-to-attack-the-kubernetes-cluster | 8 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4223a0c2-2a96-4742-b6ec-2ce9fa0019ba
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Platform LogsData Source: KubernetesDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AzurePlatform: KubernetesResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: ExecutionTactic: Lateral MovementUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3