Azure VM Extension CRUD Operation with Unusual Source ASN
Identifies create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations against Azure VM or VM scale set extensions ("MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/EXTENSIONS/*" or the scale set equivalent) where the combination of the…
Description
Identifies create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations against Azure VM or VM scale set extensions ("MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/EXTENSIONS/*" or the scale set equivalent) where the combination of the targeted extension resource name and the source autonomous system (AS) number has not been observed recently. VM extensions such as CustomScript and DSC run with high privilege on the guest (SYSTEM on Windows, root on Linux), so writing, modifying, or removing them is a common code-execution and persistence primitive. By keying a new terms approach on the extension resource name and the source AS number, this rule surfaces extension operations originating from networks that have not historically managed that extension, while routine first-party Microsoft automation (which originates from well-known Microsoft AS numbers) is excluded.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Infrastructure-as-code, configuration management, and patching automation routinely create, update, and delete VM extensions. The first time a given extension resource name is operated on from a new source AS number will alert. Baseline expected management networks (corporate egress, CI/CD runners, third-party automation SaaS) and exclude their AS numbers if the activity is verified as authorized. Read operations are typically not emitted to the Azure activity log; the rule predominantly fires on WRITE and DELETE.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.pwnedlabs.io/diving-deep-into-azure-vm-attack-vectors | 6 |
| hackingthe.cloud/azure/run-command-abuse/ | 4 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/extensions/custom-script-windows | 3 |
| www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/7-ways-to-execute-command-on-azure-virtual-machine-virtual-machine-scale-sets/ | 6 |
| www.sysdig.com/blog/the-expendable-extension-name-azure-vmaccess-naming-chaos-password-resets-and-a-detection-gap | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d69d05f8-d48a-4dcb-b226-fb2efbedd6ba
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Activity LogsDomain: CloudDomain: EndpointNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AzureProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: ExecutionTactic: PersistenceThreat: Cloud VM ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3