Azure Arc Cluster Credential Access by Identity from Unusual Source
Detects when a service principal or user performs an Azure Arc cluster credential listing operation from a source IP not previously associated with that identity. The `listClusterUserCredential` action retrieves…
Description
Detects when a service principal or user performs an Azure Arc cluster credential listing operation from a source IP not previously associated with that identity. The `listClusterUserCredential` action retrieves credentials for the Arc Cluster Connect proxy, enabling kubectl access through the Azure ARM API. An adversary using stolen service principal credentials will typically call this operation from infrastructure not previously seen for that SP. By tracking the combination of caller identity and source IP, this rule avoids false positives from backend services and CI/CD pipelines that rotate IPs but maintain consistent identity-to-IP patterns over time.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- A service principal used by a CI/CD pipeline may trigger this rule when the pipeline runs from a new IP range for the first time (e.g., migrating to a new runner pool). The 7-day history window will learn the new IPs after the first occurrence.
- Administrators accessing Arc clusters from a new VPN endpoint or travel location. Validate the caller identity matches an expected user and correlate with known travel or access patterns.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-arc/kubernetes/cluster-connect | 3 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/connectedk8s#az-connectedk8s-proxy | 2 |
| nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2022-37968 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.ibm.com/think/x-force/identifying-abusing-azure-arc-for-hybrid-escalation-persistence | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 022c37cd-5a4f-422b-8227-b136b7a23180
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Activity LogsData Source: Azure ArcDomain: CloudNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: AzureResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3