Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation to Microsoft Graph
Identifies potential session hijacking or token replay in Microsoft Entra ID. This rule detects cases where a user signs in and subsequently accesses Microsoft Graph from a different IP address using the same session…
Description
Identifies potential session hijacking or token replay in Microsoft Entra ID. This rule detects cases where a user signs in and subsequently accesses Microsoft Graph from a different IP address using the same session ID. This may indicate a successful OAuth phishing attack, session hijacking, or token replay attack, where an adversary has stolen a session cookie or refresh/access token and is impersonating the user from an alternate host or location.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- This pattern may occur during legitimate device switching or roaming between networks (e.g., corporate to mobile). Developers or power users leveraging multiple environments may also trigger this detection if session persistence spans IP ranges. Still, this behavior is rare and warrants investigation when rapid IP switching and Graph access are involved.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/ | 15from 2 sources |
| github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools | 16from 2 sources |
| pushsecurity.com/blog/consentfix | 8 |
| www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/ | 19 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 0d3d2254-2b4a-11f0-a019-f661ea17fbcc
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsData Source: Microsoft GraphData Source: Microsoft Graph Activity LogsDomain: APIDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: HighPerformance: FastPlatform: Entra IDProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Initial AccessUse Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3