Entra ID Kali365 Default User-Agent Detected
Identifies the default user agent string associated with Kali365 (also referred to as Kali365 Live), a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that automates OAuth 2.0 device code phishing and adversary-in-the-middle…
Description
Identifies the default user agent string associated with Kali365 (also referred to as Kali365 Live), a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that automates OAuth 2.0 device code phishing and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session capture against Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Entra ID. The Kali365 Electron desktop client identifies itself with the user agent `kali365-live/1.0.0` when polling for and replaying captured OAuth tokens, so its appearance in Entra ID sign-in logs, Entra ID audit logs, or the Microsoft 365 unified audit log indicates that an attacker-controlled Kali365 client is interacting with the tenant using stolen tokens. Unlike dual-use offensive tooling, Kali365 is a criminal service with no legitimate enterprise use, making this user agent a high-fidelity indicator of active account compromise.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Security researchers, sandbox detonations, or red team engagements that intentionally run the Kali365 client against a monitored tenant may generate this user agent. Document approved research activity and exclude the associated principals, source IPs, or tenants if expected.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/token-bingo-dont-let-your-code-be-the-winner/ | 7 |
| www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260521 | 6 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4b11dbab-ce37-49c4-bdf1-cdf64b405d96
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft 365Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit LogsData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsDomain: CloudDomain: EmailDomain: IdentityDomain: SaaSNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalPlatform: Entra IDPlatform: Microsoft 365Profile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessThreat: AiTM PhishingThreat: Kali365Use Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3