Entra ID OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application
Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft Entra ID where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure…
Description
Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft Entra ID where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD resources. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources are flagged, as they are commonly abused in phishing campaigns like ConsentFix. Additionally, any FOCI family application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory resource is flagged since this API is rarely used legitimately and attackers target it for stealth. First-party apps are trusted by default in all tenants and cannot be blocked, making them ideal for OAuth phishing attacks.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 5 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-azure-monitor-sign-ins-log-schema | 8 |
| github.com/secureworks/family-of-client-ids-research | 5 |
| pushsecurity.com/blog/consentfix | 8 |
| www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/ | 19 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 14fa0285-fe78-4843-ac8e-f4b481f49da9
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: MediumPerformance: FastPlatform: Entra IDProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Initial AccessThreat: AiTM PhishingUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3