Azure VM Extension Deployment by User
Identifies the successful deployment of a high-risk Azure Virtual Machine extension by an interactive user principal. Attackers with privileged Azure RBAC roles can abuse VM extensions such as VMAccess,…
Description
Identifies the successful deployment of a high-risk Azure Virtual Machine extension by an interactive user principal. Attackers with privileged Azure RBAC roles can abuse VM extensions such as VMAccess, CustomScriptExtension, and RunCommand to execute arbitrary code, create backdoor accounts, harvest credentials, and establish persistence on Azure-hosted virtual machines without requiring direct network access to the VM.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Legitimate administrators and automation may deploy Custom Script, Run Command, DSC, or monitoring extensions during provisioning, patching, or guest configuration. Baseline expected principals, VMs, and extension types before tuning exclusions.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/extensions/overview | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e842d39d-ead1-48c6-97f1-6b055476c2f3
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Azure Activity LogsDomain: CloudDomain: EndpointNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: AzureProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: ExecutionTactic: PersistenceThreat: Cloud VM ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3