Entra ID Multiple Device Registrations by a Single User
Detects multiple Microsoft Entra ID device registrations by a single user, where three or more distinct devices are registered within a 15-minute window. A legitimate user enrolling a device produces a single…
Description
Detects multiple Microsoft Entra ID device registrations by a single user, where three or more distinct devices are registered within a 15-minute window. A legitimate user enrolling a device produces a single "Register device" event; registering multiple distinct devices in quick succession is uncommon and is the fingerprint behavior of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits and stolen-token replay tooling (for example Kali365), which mint a new Azure AD-joined device, and therefore a new Primary Refresh Token (PRT), per relay or replay attempt. Each registered device is a separate certificate-bound principal whose PRT survives user-level session revocation and password resets, so multiple registrations on a single low-privilege identity establish device-bound persistence at scale.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- A user legitimately enrolling several devices in a short window (for example, a new laptop and phone during onboarding, or re-registering a device after a wipe) can produce three or more registrations. Validate against the user's device inventory and onboarding activity, and consider raising the threshold or tightening the window if benign multi-device enrollment is common in the environment.
- Bulk provisioning workflows, autopilot/MDM rollouts, or device-management tooling that registers devices on behalf of users may generate multiple registrations across many users at once. Suppress during planned rollout windows.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| any.run/malware-trends/kali365/ | 4 |
| arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/token-bingo-dont-let-your-code-be-the-winner/ | 7 |
| www.huntress.com/blog/kali365-device-code-phishing-kit | 4 |
| www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260521 | 6 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 960b1cef-f94d-4150-863d-b1dc311739de
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalPlatform: Entra IDResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Initial AccessTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3