Entra ID ADRS Token Request by Microsoft Authentication Broker
Detects suspicious OAuth 2.0 token requests where the Microsoft Authentication Broker (29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e) requests access to the Device Registration Service (01cb2876-7ebd-4aa4-9cc9-d28bd4d359a9)…
Description
Detects suspicious OAuth 2.0 token requests where the Microsoft Authentication Broker (29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e) requests access to the Device Registration Service (01cb2876-7ebd-4aa4-9cc9-d28bd4d359a9) on behalf of a user principal. The presence of the adrs_access scope in the authentication processing details suggests an attempt to access ADRS, which is atypical for standard user sign-ins. This behavior may reflect an effort to abuse device registration for unauthorized persistence, such as acquiring a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) or establishing a trusted session.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/ | 19 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d121f0a8-4875-11f0-bb2b-f661ea17fbcd
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: MediumPerformance: FastPlatform: Entra IDProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: PersistenceThreat: AiTM PhishingUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3