Entra ID Domain Federation Configuration Change
Detects when domain federation settings are configured or modified in an Entra ID tenant via the Microsoft Graph API. Adversaries with Global Administrator or Domain Administrator privileges may add a custom domain,…
Description
Detects when domain federation settings are configured or modified in an Entra ID tenant via the Microsoft Graph API. Adversaries with Global Administrator or Domain Administrator privileges may add a custom domain, verify ownership, and configure it to federate authentication with an attacker-controlled identity provider. Once federated, the adversary can forge SAML or WS-Federation tokens to authenticate as any user under that domain, bypassing MFA and conditional access policies. This technique, commonly known as Golden SAML, was used by UNC2452 (APT29) during the SolarWinds campaign for persistent, stealthy access to victim tenants.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc2452-merged-into-apt29 | 2 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/domain-post-federationconfiguration | Only this detection cites it |
| medium.com/tenable-techblog/roles-allowing-to-abuse-entra-id-federation-for-persistence-and-privilege-escalation-df9ca6e58360 | 3from 2 sources |
| securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/i-spy-escalating-to-entra-id-global-admin/ | 3 |
| techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoft-entra-blog/understanding-and-mitigating-golden-saml-attacks/4418864 | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 1cfb39e1-4b6c-4dc7-85fe-733e4a1a33ca
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit LogsDomain: CloudDomain: IdentityNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: Entra IDResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3