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Privilege Boundary Enumeration Detected via Defend for Containers

This rule detects the execution of the "id", "whoami", "capsh", "getcap", and "lsns" commands inside a container. These commands are used to enumerate the privilege boundary of the container, which can be used by an…

Description

This rule detects the execution of the "id", "whoami", "capsh", "getcap", and "lsns" commands inside a container. These commands are used to enumerate the privilege boundary of the container, which can be used by an adversary to gain information about the container and the services running inside it.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • There is a potential for false positives if the "id", "whoami", "capsh", "getcap", or "lsns" commands are used for legitimate purposes, such as debugging or troubleshooting. For example, an operator may use the "id" command to verify the identity of the current user, or the "whoami" command to verify the current user. It is important to investigate any alerts generated by this rule to determine if they are indicative of malicious activity or part of legitimate container activity.

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