Suspicious Container Runtime CLI Execution
Detects execution of container runtime CLI tools (ctr, crictl, nerdctl) with arguments indicating container creation, command execution inside existing containers, image manipulation, or host filesystem mounting.…
Description
Detects execution of container runtime CLI tools (ctr, crictl, nerdctl) with arguments indicating container creation, command execution inside existing containers, image manipulation, or host filesystem mounting. These tools interact directly with the container runtime socket, bypassing the Kubernetes API server, RBAC authorization, admission webhooks, pod security standards, and Kubernetes audit logging entirely. Attackers with host-level access may use these tools to create privileged ghost containers, exec into other pods to steal service account tokens and secrets, pull attacker-controlled images, and destroy evidence, all while remaining invisible to Kubernetes-level monitoring.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Platform automation, node bootstrap, and legitimate break-glass admin sessions may use these CLIs with overlapping arguments. Tune by parent process, user, or host role (worker vs bastion).
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609/ | 6 |
| book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/containerd-ctr-privilege-escalation | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 0398c0a2-1237-478e-84c4-84510f1925e6
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic Defend for ContainersDomain: ContainersNoise: UnknownOS: LinuxPerformance: FastPlatform: KubernetesPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3