Modification of Persistence Relevant Files Detected via Defend for Containers
This rule detects attempts from within a Linux container to create or modify files commonly used for persistence on native Linux systems, including cron jobs, systemd units, sudoers files, and shell profile…
Description
This rule detects attempts from within a Linux container to create or modify files commonly used for persistence on native Linux systems, including cron jobs, systemd units, sudoers files, and shell profile configurations. While many of these mechanisms do not provide reliable persistence in typical containerized workloads, such modifications are unusual and may indicate persistence attempts, privilege abuse, or preparation for container escape, especially when performed outside normal image build or package management processes.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 5 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
- T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsAlso under Privilege Escalation.34 detections cover this technique
- T1543Create or Modify System ProcessAlso under Privilege Escalation.118 detections cover this technique
- T1546Event Triggered ExecutionAlso under Privilege Escalation.106 detections cover this technique
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| flare.io/learn/resources/blog/teampcp-cloud-native-ransomware | 13 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f246e70e-5e20-4006-8460-d72b023d6adf
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic Defend for ContainersDomain: ContainersNoise: UnknownOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: ExecutionTactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3