GKE Pod Exec Cloud Instance Metadata Access
Detects successful GKE pod exec sessions whose command references Google Cloud instance metadata endpoints, including metadata.google.internal, computeMetadata/v1, or the link-local metadata IP 169.254.169.254.…
Description
Detects successful GKE pod exec sessions whose command references Google Cloud instance metadata endpoints, including metadata.google.internal, computeMetadata/v1, or the link-local metadata IP 169.254.169.254. Workloads that reach the GKE metadata service from an exec session are often attempting to harvest short-lived credentials or instance attributes from the node or workload identity boundary. That behavior is high risk because it can expose cloud credentials to code running inside a container. GKE records the command in gcp.audit.labels.command.gke.io/command when an explicit command is passed to exec.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Break-glass debugging from platform engineers may include curl to the metadata IP or hostname.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/concepts/protecting-cluster-metadata | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- c8bf56cc-c648-4f88-bb4f-9e504d0779d1
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: GCPData Source: GCP Audit LogsData Source: Google Cloud PlatformDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: GCPPlatform: KubernetesProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Credential AccessTactic: ExecutionThreat: IMDS Credential TheftUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3